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In their insightful article, Brent Kious and Margaret Battin (2019) correctly identify an inconsistency 
between an involuntary psychiatric commitment for suicide prevention and physician aid-in-dying 
(PAD). They declare that it may be possible to resolve the problem by articulating “objective standards 
for evaluating the severity of others’ suffering,” but ultimately they admit that this task is beyond the 
scope of their article since the solution depends on “a deep and difficult” question about comparing 
the worseness of two possible scenarios: letting someone die (who could have been helped) with not 
letting someone die (whose suffering could only be alleviated by death). In our commentary, we argue 
that creating such standards is more difficult than the authors assume because of the many types of 
deep uncertainties we have to deal with: (1) diagnostic, (2) motivational, and (3) existential (cf. 
Żuradzki 2017).  
A “diagnostic” uncertainty was overlooked by Kious and Battin since they did not fully 
recognize the unique nature of the diagnosis of mental illnesses. They rightly point out that terminality 
in physician aid-in-dying requests is not important per se and should be treated rather as an instrument 
to determine that a further life for a given patient would be most likely “worse than death.” However, 
this may only be grasped in some cases of somatic illnesses, where it is at least sometimes possible to 
make an unquestionable diagnosis and prognosis based on the understanding of pathophysiological 
mechanisms. For example, if a doctor supposes that a patient has prostate cancer, she can easily verify 
her hypothesis by referring the patient for a prostate biopsy. In the case of mental illnesses, there is 
usually no such a laboratory method of diagnosis confirmation, even if one considers mental illness as 
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caused by subtle malformations of the brain (Regier 2012, 293). Mental illnesses are diagnosed by 
physicians almost entirely on the basis of an interview with a patient and observation of a patient’s 
behavior, and therefore do not capture any information about the underlying pathophysiology that 
causes the mental disorder (Farah and Gillihan 2012). These epistemic limitations of psychiatry, which 
amount to limited laboratory testing and imaging methods of diagnosis confirmation, make the 
diagnosis of mental illnesses more uncertain than many somatic diseases, especially serious cancers, 
which are typical reasons for a physician aid-in-dying (e.g., about 80% of the patients requesting and 
receiving PAD in Oregon have been diagnosed with cancer; see Sumner 2017).  
Moreover, diagnostic uncertainty in psychiatry has a deeper dimension. Some maladies 
described by a single term of, say, “depression” may in fact not constitute a single illnesses but a set 
of different ones caused by varying factors, and the mechanism of the formation and development of 
such an illnesses is not yet understood (Farah and Gillhan 2012; Stegenga 2018, 66). If the etiology of 
mental illness is unknown, it may be difficult for a psychiatrist to formulate any reliable judgment on 
the development of the illness or the expected quality of life of a psychiatric patient (cf. Vandenberghe 
2017, 157–158). Patients’ self-reports and external observations of their behavior, even if frequently 
conducted, are insufficient to satisfy any reasonable threshold of certainty, which is necessary in cases 
of physician aid-in-dying. 
There are at least two counterarguments against this view. One could argue that the etiology 
of many somatic diseases is also unknown (e.g., hypertension, migraine) yet these types of diseases 
are rarely reasons for physician aid-in-dying requests. One could also argue that most PAD requests 
(or euthanasia requests, if legal) are often done not because of direct physical pain or suffering but 
rather for psychological or existential suffering, such as perceived or expected loss of dignity or fear of 
future physical suffering (Chambaere et al. 2010). This is true, but in many somatic diseases, in contrast 
to psychiatry, physicians have better tools to check whether patients’ expectations and fears are 
adequate (or not) to the seriousness of their illness (Hyman 2010). Thus, although we agree with Kious 
and Battin that “the suffering associated with mental illnesses can sometimes be as severe, intractable, 
and prolonged as the suffering due to physical illnesses,” we wonder how, if at all, we can learn about 
the sources of this suffering and how, if at all, decisions granting euthanasia requests from persons 
with mental suffering could be institutionally monitored and controlled. 
This problem is even more visible in the second type of uncertainty (“motivational”), which is 
related to the patient’s decision-making capacities. Kious and Battin agree with existing regulations (in 
countries where PAD is legal) that uniformly require that recipients of PAD are not suffering from 
impaired judgment due to an illness and they believe that this requirement may at least sometimes be 
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fulfilled by persons with severe mental illnesses. Therefore, to resolve the inconsistency in question, 
the standards they propose should provide criteria for dealing with decision-maker uncertainty about 
a patient’s motives for seeking death: whether and to what extent the patient’s exhibited values are 
distorted by her illness, and whether a wish for death is intrinsic or not to her illness (“is more likely to 
be a reaction to the illness … than a reaction from it”). Unfortunately, instead of defining these precise 
criteria, they provide a hypothetical, but hardly surprising, example (i.e., “someone with a severe 
phobia of dogs”) to show that it is conceptually possible to distinguish a reaction to the illness from a 
reaction from illness, even in cases of illness for which suicidal ideation are characteristic.  
Kious and Battin also suggest that it is feasible to pinpoint proper motives for PAD requests in 
such a way that our judgments about a patient’s mental capacity do not hinge on our judgments about 
the patient’s values. Again, this is highly controversial, because the assessment of mental capacity 
(including the sources of a wish for death) does not consist only in checking structural relations 
between one’s attitudinal mental states independently of whether those states are justified. If we want 
to check how a patient responds to reasons (e.g., about expected suffering or the prospect of her 
illness), we must use some normative standards about what constitutes reasonable or appropriate 
reactions and attitudes (Banner 2012). Moreover, the authors assume that the justified judgment that 
one’s suffering is so great it is better to die should be a reaction to the medically diagnosable bodily or 
psychological state or condition. This means that they exclude any cases of mental or psychological 
suffering due to (currently) nondiagnosable sources (euthanasia is allowed for such reasons in some 
countries, e.g., The Netherlands, provided that the suffering is unbearable, there is no prospect of 
improvement, and the other legal requirements are met). Of course, mental suffering stemming from 
nondiagnosable sources covers different types of suffering, such as emotional, existential, or spiritual, 
but the distinction between (diagnosable) psychical suffering and (nondiagnosable) mental suffering 
is also value loaded (Raus and Sterckx 2019). In particular, this is visible if we take into account the fact 
that current psychiatry tends to pathologize normal behaviors and promotes a biomedicalization of 
common problems in life that may result from the tremendous impact of the pharmaceutical industry 
on psychiatric research (Bueter 2019). 
Finally, the “existential” type of uncertainty is characteristic for all life-and-death medical 
decisions and stems from a need to weigh expected harms of existence that are full of suffering with 
the alleged “benefits” of dying earlier. At first glance, these values are incommensurable, like apples 
and oranges, which makes the project of their weighing conceptually unsound. Furthermore, their 
weighing depends on solving the age-old philosophical question about the wrongness of death. 
Moreover, the authors suggest that we should also weigh the severity of a patient’s suffering, “both 
now and in the foreseeable future,” which refers again to problems with “diagnostic” uncertainties in 
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psychiatry. At the end of their article they recall “a deep and difficult” question that should be solved 
if we want to deal with an inconsistency between an involuntary psychiatric commitment for suicide 
prevention and PAD: “When is it worse that someone dies, whether from suicide or with physician 
assistance, who could have been helped, and when is it worse that someone whose suffering could 
only be alleviated by death continues to suffer?” We find this description too simplistic (e.g., it is not 
clear what kind of worseness relation they have in mind, i.e., what is worse than what?). Instead, we 
understand that in such situations a decision maker has two possible decisions: to reject the PAD 
request or to accept it. This may produce four possible outcomes: 1a, a patient has “a nonauthentic” 
wish for death and it is rejected; 1b, a patient has “a nonauthentic” wish for death and it is accepted; 
2a, a patient has “an authentic” wish for death and it is accepted; 2b, a patient has “an authentic” wish 
for death and it is rejected. We understand that their worry is that the standard they try to propose at 
the beginning of their article should be helpful in balancing the risks of the two types of errors that 
using the terminology from statistics we can name: a type I error (false positive or our point 1b) and a 
type II error (false negative or our point 2b). In our opinion, the main discussion between advocates 
and opponents of the legalization of PAD depends on attitudes toward weighing these two types of 
risks: The opponents believe that avoiding errors such as in 1b is much more important than avoiding 
those in 2b. In particular, they claim that the importance of avoiding this type of error stems from its 
irreversibility: It is better to bet against allowing psychiatric patients to die, even if we risk not 
recognizing some “authentic” wishes for death (i.e., making error 2b). 
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